In recent epistemology of logic, it is common to assume that any anti-exceptionalist theory of logic derives from Quinean theory, characterised by its evidential holism, epistemological empiricism, and naturalism. Many of the criticisms of anti-exceptionalism are provoked by the role of evidential holism. By distinguishing different aspects—metaphysical, methodological and evidential epistemological (Martin & Hjortland 2022, 2024)—anti-exceptionalist theories can leave aside the latter and continue to defend a metaphysical and/or methodological epistemological anti-exceptionalism, contemporary variants of the view not derived from Quinean epistemological holism.
The paper evaluates a recent anti-exceptionalist proposal by Peregrin and Svodoba (2021) to argue that it faces the same difficulties as conventionalism, though it can address the adoption problem identified by Kripke-Boghossian and Wright (2024) while keeping mainly faithful to the anti-exceptionalism it aims to promote.